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144 ESTATE OF VAl [65 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 28168. In Bank. Aug. 25, 1966.] 
Estate of GIOVANNI VAl, Deceased. ALAN CRANSTON, 
as State Controller, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. 
HENRY G. BODKIN, as Executor, etc., et at, Objectors 
and Appellants. 
[1] Taxation-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective 
at or After Death.-A testator's bequest to a daughter pursu-
ant to a valid contract entered into during the testator's life-
time is not subject to inheritance tax where the testator 
received full consideration for the promised bequest in money 
or money's worth within the meaning of the inheritance tax 
law. 
[2] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective at or 
After Death.-Assuming validity of and sufficient certainty in 
a property settlement agreement, as well as adequate consider-
ation under the inheritance tax law for a promise in the agree-
ment to make a bequest to the parties' daughter, though the 
actual transfer to the daughter was postponed until the promi-
sor's death, her rights arose immediately on the signing of the 
agreement; and the will, being merely a conduit for performing 
the obligation for which the promisor's estate would be liable 
in any event, could not render the bequest subject to inherit~ 
ance tax. 
[3] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective at or 
After Death.-When a testator provides in his will for pay-
ment of a valid obligation supported by adequate consideration 
within the meaning of the inheritance tax law and the obliga-
tion would be enforceable without regard to the will, payment 
of the obligation pursuant to the will is not taxable as a 
transfer by will. (Disapproving Estate 01 Grogan, 63 Ca1.App. 
536 [219 P. 87], insofar as it is inconsistent with the views 
expressed. ) 
[4] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective at or 
After Death.-Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, §§ 13601-13603 (a) , 
making a transfer by will subject to inheritance tax even 
though made pursuant to the decedent's agreement with the 
transferee for adequate consideration, do not represent a 
correct interpretation of the legislative intent as to the taxabil-
ity of such transfers. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Inheritance and Gift Taxes, § 26; Am. Jur., 
Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Taxes (rev ed §§ 159 et seq). 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Taxation, § 432; [5] Taxation, 
§ 424(1) (c); [6-8] Taxation, § 431(1); [9] Taxation, § 431(2); 
[10] Taxation, § 431(6). 
) 
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[6] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Exemptions.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13981, proscribing a deduction for anything that does not 
actually reduce the amount of nn inheritance or transfer, the 
word "transfer" was not intended to relate to a transfer by 
will where the beneficiary has the right to receive the transfer 
independently of the will. 
[6] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration. 
-A testator's bequest for the support of his daughter pursu-
ant to a property settlement agreement was free from inherit-
ance tax only if the circumstances indicated the testator 
received adequate consideration for his promise ~o make the 
bequest. 
[7] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration. 
-Sufficient consideration as between spouses in a property 
settlement agreement does not warrant the conclusion that the 
consideration was sufficient for the purposes of determining 
whether an inheritance tax is due on a bequest in a will made 
pursuant to the terms of the property settlement agreement. 
[8] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-ConSfderation. 
-The purpose of Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 13641-13648, making a 
testator's actual transfer of property during his lifetime 
taxable under inheritance tax law to the extent it was made 
without valuable consideration where the testator retained 
certain incidents of ownership· over the property during his 
life, is to prevent evasion of inheritance tax. 
[9] ld.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration. 
-To determine whether a testator received consideration for 
his promise in a property settlement agreement to make a 
bequest, events that occurred after his death and that affected 
the terms of the agreement cannot be ignored; and where his 
estate was enriched to the extent his wife received less than 
she was entitled to receive had she rescinded the agreement for 
his fraud, the consideration received by the testator for his 
promise to make the bequest and, accordingly, the limit of the 
deduction allowable for inheritance tax purposes must be 
measured by the difference between what the wife would have 
received through recission and the amount she received under 
the agreement and the later compromise settlement. 
[10] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration. 
. -A testator's being entitled to the custody of his daughter 
pursuant to a property settlement agreement in which he 
promised to make a bequest for the daughter's support could 
not be viewed as consideration in money or money's worth for 
the purpose of determining adequacy of consideration for the 
bequest so as to exempt it from inheritance tax. 
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bern-
ardino County overruling an objection to the report of an 
inheritance tax appraiser and fixing an inheritance tax on a 
trust estate. Harold R. Haberkorn, Judge. Reversed. 
Michael G. Luddy, Harry A. Olivar, George R. Phillips and 
Henry G. Bodkin, Jr., for Objectors and Appellants. 
Charles J. Barry, Walter H. Miller and James F. Rogers for 
Petitioner and Respondent. 
MOSK, J.-This is an appeal by the executors of the will of 
Giovanni ( John) Vai from an order fixing an inheritance tax .. 
and overruling objections to a report of the inheritance tax 
appraiser imposing a tax on property placed in trust for 
John's daughter under the_terms of his will. [1] The ques-
tion for determination is whether an inheritance tax may be 
levied on property which a testator leaves to a daughter by 
will pursuant to a valid contract entered into during his life-
time. We hold, for reasons which shall hereinafter appear, that 
such a bequest is not subject to an inheritance tax if the 
testator has received full consideration in money or money'8 
worth, within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, for the 
promised bequest. 
John and Tranquilla Vai were married in 1907. They had 
one daughter, Madeline (now 40 years old) who is mentally 
arrested and requires constant care and attention. After a 
period of marital discord, Tranquilla filed an action for sepa-
rate maintenance against John. In March 1953 they entered 
into a property settlement agreement through which Tran-
quilla was to receive less than half the community property 
but John undertook to support Madeline during his lifetime, 
to hold his wife harmless for Madeline's support, and to 
provide in his will that a sufficient amount of property be left 
in trust for Madeline to support her as long as she lived.1 
1 Article IV of the property settlement agreement provides in part, II The 
Husband covenants and agrees to assume full responsibility for the sup-
port, maintenance and care of said Madeline Vai and represents that he 
has heretofore made a Will wherein and whereby a trust is created for the 
support, maintenance and care of said Madeline Vai after the death of the 
Husband. The Husband hereby covenants and agrees and binds himself to 
maintain in full force and effect, a Last Will and Testament which shall 
provide for the distribution into a trust of which such trust said Madeline 
Vai or her duly appoiuted guardian shall be the beneficiary, an amount of 
money or property as will, upon the Husband's death, fairly and adequately 
pay for and discharge any and all expense for the care, support and mainte-
nance of said Madeline Vai during the remainder of her lifetime. The Hus-
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Subsequently, Tranquilla's action for separate maintenance 
was abandoned, but she left the family home and moved to 
another residence. 
In April 1953 John executed a will in which he carried out 
the obligations imposed upon him by the agreement and left 
the residue of his estate in a trust under the terms of which 
the income would be paid to Madeline's guardian for her 
support and maintenance. He died on February 14,1957. 
It is estimated that the cost of supporting Madeline is 
$2,500 a month and, when this amount is capitalized, it repre-
sents a liability of $515,341.56 as of the date of John's deatll. 
The value of the residue considerably exceeded the amount 
necessary for Madeline's support, but the issue in controversy 
here is confined to the taxability of the $515,341.56. The 
inheritance tax appraiser representing the Controller, peti-
tioner in this proceeding, imposed a tax on the entire residue, 
and the executors objected to his report, claiming that 
$515,341.56 should be allowed as a deduction for the purpose 
of calculating the inheritance tax due because assertedly this 
sum was left by John in satisfaction of a valid obligation, 
supported by adequate consideration. The probate court over-
ruled the objections, and the executors appeal from the court's 
order. 
Shortly after John '8 death, Tranquilla brought an action to 
rescind the property settlement agreement on the ground that 
John had fraudulently concealed community assets from her. 
We held, in Vai v. Bank of America (1961) 56 Cal.2d 329 [15 
Cal.Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 247], that John had committed 
constructive fraud as a matter of law and that Tranquilla was 
entitled to rescind the agreement.2 This decision and its conse-
quences will be discussed in the portion of this opinion 
concerned with the question of consideration. 
band further covenants and agrees to hold harmless the Wife during the 
balance of the lives of the parties hereto, for the care, support and mainte-
nance of said Madeline Vai.' , The will "heretofore made" referred to in 
this provision was apparently revoked and a new will executed by John in 
April 1953. 
2The executors claim that we merely held in the Vai case that Tranquilla 
was not barred from rescinding the agreement by laches. However, the 
opinion, after holding that John was guilty of constructive fraud as a 
matter of law, states, "It is manifest from the foregoing that plaintiff 
is neither estopped nor barred by laches from seeking to rescind the 
property settlement agreement, and that she is entitled to the relief sought 
because of the constructive fraud of her husband." (Italics added.) (56 
Cal.2d at p. 344.) The relief TranquilIa sought is described at page 333 of 
the opinion as rescission of the agreement on the ground of fraud, recov-
ery of part of the property received by John under the agreement, and 
damages in the event recovery thereof cannot be obtained. 
) 
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Section 13601 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides, 
"A transfer by wiU or the laws of succession of this State 
from a person who dies seized or possessed of the property 
transferred while a resident of this State is a transfer subject 
to this part." (Italics added.) The executors, in contending 
that the money left for Madeline's support is not taxable, 
assert that it was transferred to her pursuant to the property 
settlement agreement between John and Tranquilla rather 
than "by will," that as soon as the agreement was signed· 
Madeline had a vested right to support from her father which 
she could have enforced as a third party beneficiary in an 
action for damages or quasi-specific performance without 
regard to the will, and that the will was merely the instrument 
by which John's obligation under the' agreement was per. 
formed. They place reliance primarily upon Estate of B~lknap 
(1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 644 [152 P.2d 657]. [2] In discuss-
ing this contention, we shall first assume arguendo that John 
received adequate consideration within the meaning of the 
inheritance tax law for his bequest to Madeline and that the 
property settlement agreement is valid and sufficiently certain 
in all respects. 
In Estate of Belknap (1944) supra, 66 Cal.App.2d 644, a 
husband and wife entered into a property settlement agree-
ment which provided that the wife was to receive a stipu-
lated monthly sum during the husband's lifetime and that he 
would authorize his executor by the' terms of his will to pur .. 
('hase a $20,000 annuity for her, from which she would receive 
the income. It was held that the value of the annuity bonds 
was not subject to inheritance tax because the transfer was 
effected by virtue of the property settlement agreement rather 
than by means of the will. The court found that the will was 
merely the conduit through which the husband's obligations . 
under the agreement were fulfilled, that the amount of the 
wife's interest in the husband's property was fixed by the 
agreement and was not changed by the will, that the provision 
in the will for the purchase of the bonds merely secured the 
vested interests transferred by the agreement, and that the 
agreement was enforceable by the wife without regard to the 
will. 
The rationale of Belknap is apposite here. If John had 
failed to carry out his obligations under the property settle-
ment agreement Madeline could have enforced her rights as a 
third party beneficiary by an action at law for damages or by 
an equitable action for quasi-specific performance. (Brow-n v. 
) 
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Superior Court (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 559,563-564 [212 P.2d 878].) 
The will could neither add to nor subtract from the benefits to 
which she was entitled by the agreement and, as in Belknap, 
the will was merely the conduit through which John's obliga-
tions under the agreement were performed. While the enjoy-
ment of the benefits Madeline was to receive under the will 
and the actual transfer of the property to her were postponed 
until John's death, her right to receive such benefits upon his 
death arose immediately upon the signing of the agreement, 
and the will was merely the instrumentality through which he 
fulfilled his obligations. Madeline's interest cannot be ren-
dered taxable by the mere fact that John performed, by a 
provision in his will, an obligation for which his estate would 
have been liable in any event. 
The Controller argues that Belknap is distinguishable 
because there the amounts the husband agreed to pay were 
\ 
specified in the agreement, whereas in the present case the 
sums which John was to provide for Madeline's support dur ... 
ing her lifetime and at his death were not specified and could 
vary, depending upon the size of John's estate and Madeline's 
needs.' This argument goes to the question whether the 
property settlement agreement in the present case is enfor~­
able and sufficiently certain, but does not relate to whether, 
assuming the enforceability of the agreement, the life estate 
must nevertheless be deemed taxable as a transfer by will.4 
Moreover, the amount which Madeline needed for her support 
readily could have been made certain by being reduced to a 
monetary sum, as was done in the present proceeding, and 
John's promise in the agreement to leave her an amount of 
money in his will which would be necessary for her support 
was not made contingent upon the size of his estate. 
'The agreement provided only that the will would leave in trust for 
Madeline'8 benefit "an amount of money or property as will . . • fairly 
and adequately pay for and discharge any and all expense' , for Madeline's 
care and support. 
"The Controller also contends that there is language in the agreement 
in Belknap which distinguishes it from the contract involved here. In 
BeZknap it was provided, "Said party of the first part does by these 
presents, promise and agree by and through his Last Will and Testament 
(lnd does hereby authorize, empower, direct and command the Executor 
of his said Last Will and Testament, to purchase immediately upon his 
appointment an annuity ••.. " While it is true that this provision pur-
ported to give a present direction to the executor to carry out the terms 
of the agreement, and article IV of the agreement between John and 
Tranquilla, quoted in footnote 1, only recites that John shall keep in full 
force and effect a will which would carry out his obligations, this differ-
ence seems of little significance. 
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In re Howell's Estate (1931) 255 N.Y. 211 [174 N.E. 4571, 
cited by the Controller, is distinguishable. There, the separa-
tion agreement provided that the wife would receive under her 
husband's will one-third of the net income from his estate. 
The court held that the agreement did not recognize the exist-
ence of a specific debt and that the husband agreed only to 
devise a portion of his estate if he had one. In the present case, 
John agreed to provide sufficient funds in his will for Made-
line's support, regardless of the size or character of bis 
estate. 
The Controller relies principally on the case of Estate 01 
Grogan (1923) 63 Cal.App. 536 [219 P. 87], in support of bis 
claim that Madeline's interest is subject to a tax. In Grogan a 
husband and wife entered into a property settlement agree-
ment which provided that the husban~ would pay bis wife 
$3,000 a year during his lifetime and that, after his death, sbe 
would receive the income from a trust fund created by his 
will, which would consist of one-half of his estate, but not 
exceeding $50,000. The parties were subsequently divorced, 
and the husband made a will in conformity with the agree-
ment. A tax was imposed on the value of the life estate 
created in the will and the wife claimed, as do the executors in 
the present case, that the will merely operated as the ful1ill-
ment of the obligation of the husband under the agreement 
and did 110t constitute a bequest or transfer within the mean ... 
ing of the statutes governing inheritance taxes. Section 2 of 
the inheritance tax act provided at the time, "A tax shall be, 
and is, hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property 
. . . (1) When the transfer is by will." The court, after 
reviewing authorities from a number of jurisdictions, held 
that every transfer in the nature of a change of ownership 
effected through a will was subject to an inheritance tax under 
the ~tatute. 
The Grogan opinion states, at page 544, "No exception of 
the character claimed by appellant here is mentioned in the 
California statute. Nothing is said about any transfer by will 
arising out of an agreement, or as compensation for service, or 
in consideration of anything whatsoever. It matters not 
whether the legacy be a gratuity or 'for money's worth.' 
Thcre iq nothing in the statute which would indicate an inten-
tion on the part of the legislature that there should be any 
limitation on the apparently plain language contained therein, 
or that there should be any exception whatsoever thereto. 
Everything in the nature of a change of ownership ~ffected 
through a will is apparently included. The reason for such 
. ' .. 
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transfer is not taken into consideration. The result is all that 
is considered; that is, the transfer itself. Viewed from one 
standpoint, it might be said that Mrs. Grogan's right was one 
which rested in the agreement entered into between her and 
her husband; that sIle had in effect bought and paid for every-
thing that she was to receive, and that nothing remained to be 
done but the turning over of the property to her through the 
medium of the will. But even that does not surmount tIle 
obstacle. . . . The statute here does not provide for a tax 
because someone has a right arising out of a debt or otherwise, 
but only when a transfer of property is brought about by 
means of a will is a tax imposed. It is a tax upon the vellicle 
carrying the right, rather than a tax upon the right itself. It is 
in effect a declaration of law that when a will is used as a 
means of conveyance of property a tax must be paid for that 
privilege." (Accord, In t'e Gould's Estate (1898) 156 N.Y. 
423 [51 N.E. 287].) 
We conclude that the foregoing unequivocal rule of Grogan 
must be disapproved, for it makes the imposition of the tax 
dependent upon form rather than substance. The inheritance 
tax is imposed on the beneficial succession to property. (Estate 
of Barter (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 549, 557 [184 P.2d 305] ; Estate of 
Madison (1945) 26 Ca1.2d 453, 458 [159 P.2d 630].) Grogan 
holds that everything in the nature of a change of ownership 
effected through a will is taxable because the tax is on the 
1Jehicle carrying the right rather than on the right itself and 
that, therefore, a bequest in a will in payment of a debt is 
subject to a tax. The anomalous result of this rule is that a tax 
must be levied whenever a testator provides in his will that a 
creditor is to receive a stated sum in payment of a debt owed 
, by the testator, whereas the tax would be avoided by the mere 
failure of the testator to specify that the debt be paid, requir-
ing the creditor to receive payment by means of filing a claim 
against the estate. The Legislature could not have intended to 
make the imposition of the tax depend upon such fortuitous 
considerations. 
Moreover, as the executors correctly argue, acceptance of the 
rule in Grogan would place a premium on the violation of 
agreements similar to the one involved here. If John had 
breached his agreement and failed to provide in his will for 
Madeline's support and she had recovered the value of her lh 
estate in an action for damages against the estate, the amourJ 
of her recovery would not be, under Grogan, a transfer of 
property "brought about by means of a will" and, presun:-
) 
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ably, no tax liability would attach.1S [3] As suggested 
above, when the testator provides in his will for the payment 
of a valid obligation supported by adequate consideration 
within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, and the obliga-
tion would have been enforceable without regard to the provi-
sions of the will, it is erroneous to conclude that the payment 
is taxable as a "transfer by will." The case of Estate of 
Grogan (1923) sup'ra, 63 Cal.App. 536, is disapproved insofar 
as it is inconsistent with the views expressed herein.6 
[4] As a result of this conclusion, we must also hold that 
the provisions of sections 13601-13603 (a) of title 18 of the Cali-
fornia Administrative Code, which are in accord with the 
Grogan rule, do not represent a cot:rect interpretation of legis-
lative intent.1 
I)The Controller relies on In 1'e Kidd's Estate (1907) 188 N.Y. 274 
[80 N.E. 924J, for the proposition that if Madeline had sued the estate 
to recover the amount to which she would have been entitled under the 
property settlement agreement, she would nevertheless have been required 
to pay an inheritance tax on the sum she recovered. In Kidd, a testator 
failed to carry out the terms of an agreement to leave property to a step-
daughter in his will. and she successfully prosecuted an action to recover 
the property which he had agreed to convey to her. It was held that she 
was required to pay an inheritance tax on the amount of the judgment 
hecause she would have been subject to the tax if the decedent had per-
formed his agreement. If Grogan is correct in holding that the basis on 
which the inheritance tax is imposed is that a will is used as the means of 
carrying out the testator's intention, it would seem to follow that if the 
beneficiary receives the property by means of a court judgment rather than 
under the will, the property is not taxable as a transfer by will. This dis-
tinction was recognized in In 1'e Gould's Estate (N.Y. 1898) supra, 51 
N.E. 287, a case upon which the Controller also relies, in which it was 
stated that if the beneficiary of a contract to make a will had elected to 
recover by bringing a suit against the estate on the basis of the contract 
rather than by accepting the bequest in the will, the amounts recovered in 
such a suit would not have been subject to the tax because there would 
have been no transfer by will. 
61t has been suggested that Grogan has been overruled in Estate 0/ 
Rath (1937) 10 Cal.2d 399 [75 P.2d 509, 115 A.L.R. 836]. However, that 
case involved a different factual situation and G1'ogan was specifically 
mentioned as being distinguishable. In Rath, a husband and wife entered 
into an agreement under which the wife agreed to leave her separate prop-
erty to her husband if he survived her, and the husband agreed to leave so 
much of the property as was not necessary for his support to the wile's 
nephews, upon his death. The husband carried out his promise, and the 
court held that the property was not taxable as a transfer from the hus-
band to the nephews, since he was merely a trustee of the property for 
them, but was taxable as a transfer from the wife's estate to the nephews. 
The opinion distinguishes Grogan on the ground that it involved a situa-
tion in which the testator disposed of his own property, not property held 
by him in trust for others. (10 Ca1.2d at p. 407.) 
1The section provides: "A transfer by will is subject to the Inheritance 
Tax Law even though made pursuant to an agreement between the trans-
feree and the decedent for an adequate and full consideration in money or 
money's worth which was received by the decedent. In such case, the trans-
, 
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[5] Another contention made by the Controller is that 
Madeline's life estate must be held subject to taxation under 
the provisions of section 13981 of the Revenue and Taxation 
Code. The section provides, "This article [article 2, relating to 
deductions] is a limitation on deductions allowable. It is not 
intended by this article to allow as a deduction anything that 
does not actually reduce the amount of an inheritance or 
transfer." It is the Controller's claim that, whether Madeline 
takes the value of her life estate as a creditor or as a legatee 
she gets the same amount of money from the estate, and that 
the value of the life estate cannot be allowed as a deduction 
because it "does not actually reduce the amount of an inherit-
ance or transfer. " 
It is true that Madeline's resources would be the same 
whether she is a creditor or a legatee, but only because in the 
present case she fortuitously occupies the role of residuary 
legatee and at the same time a posture similar to that of a 
creditor insofar as John received consideration for his promise 
to leave property to her. Section 13981 could not have been 
intended to penalize her merely because she receives property 
in this dual capacity. We conclude, therefore, that the word 
"transfer" as used in the section was not intended to relate 
to a situation in which the beneficiary has a right to receive 
the transfer independently of the will. 
[6] The property left by John for Madeline's support is 
free from taxation only if the circumstances indicate that he 
received adequate consideration for his promise to leave it to 
her. We come, therefore, to the question whether such con-
sideration is present here. The executors urge that we must 
assume that John received consideration for his promise to 
support Madeline because the property settlement agreement 
was in writing (Civ. Code, § 1614), and that, therefore, John 
left the amount in question to Madeline in satisfaction' of a 
valid obligation supported by an adequate consideration. 
[7] The difficulty with this contention is the assumption 
that, merely because there may be suffi~ient consideration as 
between the spouses in a property settlement' agreement, it 
necessarily follows that there is also consideration for pur-
poses of determining whether an inheritance tax is due. This 
conclusion is unwarranted. While a grossly disproportionate 
division of property between spouses does not render the 
agreement void for inadequate consideration, since intangible 
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factors as well as the property received by the parties are 
weighed in the balance in determining the adequacy of con-
sideration as between spouses, the tax consequences of the 
contract are another matter. (Cf. Chemical Bank New York 
Trust Co. v. United States (1966) 249 F.Supp. 450, 459-460.) 
Obviously, there are unlimited contrivances for avoidance of 
the inheritance tax by the device of a bequest in fulfillment of 
an obligation undertaken in a property settlement agreement, 
for which the testator does not receive a full consideration in 
money or money's worth. 
[8] We are aided in determining what constitutes c.n-
sideration for tax purposes by the provisions of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code. relating to inter vivos transfers. (Rev. & 
Tax. Code, §§ 13641-13648.) These sections provide that where 
a testator has made an actual transfer of property during his 
lifetime, the transfer is taxable under the inheritance tax law 
to the extent that it was made without a valuable considera-
tion, if the testator retained certain specified incidents of 
ownership over the property while he was alive.8 The purpose 
of these provisions is to prevent evasion of the inheritance tax. 
(Estate of Madison (1945) supra, 26 Cal.2d 453, 463.) At the 
time of John's death, section 13641 of the code provided that 
as to inter .vivos transfers, a valuable and adequate consider-
ation was consideration in money or money's worth to the full 
value of the property transferred9 and sections 13641-13648(a) 
of title 18 of the California Administrative Code provide that 
consideration in money or money's worth does not include any 
consideration which is not reducible to money or a money 
value, such as love or affection or a promise of marriage. 
Analogism dictates that we apply the same standard of 
8For example, an inter vivos transfer is taxable to the extent that the 
testator has failed to receive consideration for it where the transfer is 
made in contemplation of death (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13642), where posses-
sion or enjoyment does not take place until after tile death of the testator 
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13643), where he has retained a life interest in the 
income (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13644), and where the transfer was made 
by means of a revocable trust (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13646). 
9Scction 13641 was amended in 1959, after J olm 's death, to provide as 
follows: 'l If a transfer specified in this article is made during lifetime 
by a resident ... for a consideration in money or money's worth, but the 
transfer is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth, the amount of the transfer subject to this part 
shall be the excess of (a) '1'he value, at the date of the transferor's death, 
of the property transferred, over (b) An amount equal to the same pro-
portion of the value, at the time of tile transferor's death, of the prop-
erty transferred which the consideration received in money or money 'II 
worth for the property transferred bears to the value, at the date of 
transfer, of the property transferred." 
) 
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cQnsideration in the situation involved here, where no actual 
transfer of property occurred during the testator's lifetime 
but the right to the transfer upon the testator's death is based 
on a valid contract into which he had entered. If wc accepted 
the view that what is consideration between the parties to an 
agreement in the situation involved here must also be deemed 
consideration for the purpose of determining whether an 
inheritance tax is payable, it would mean that property trans-
ferred by a testator who makes an actual transfer during his 
lifetime but retains some incidents of control over it, is subject 
to a greater tax burden than property over which a decedent 
has retained complete ownership during his life. The Legis-
lature could not have intended such an anomalous result. 
We must determine, therefore, whether John received con-
sideration in money or money's worth under the definition set 
forth above, for his promise to leave money in his will for 
Madeline's support, for it is only to this extent that t]1e 
amount in question is free from th,e inheritance tax. As stated 
above, a short time after John's death, Tranquilla brought an 
action to rescind the property settlement agreement on the 
ground that John had fraudulently concealed community 
assets from her. The trial court found against Tranquilla, but 
in Vai v. Bank of America (1961) supra, 56 Ca1.2d 329, we 
held that she was entitled to rescind the agreement. Subse-
quently, Tranquillaentered into a stipulation with the execu-
tors under which she received $500,000 as damages for John's 
fraud. She also waived her rights under the property settle-
ment agreement, except the right to have John earry out his 
obligations for Madeline's support. Judgment by stipulation 
was entered, setting forth the terms of the settlement and 
'decreeing that the agreement between John and Tranquilla 
was valid. 
[9] In determining whether John received consideration 
for his promise, we cannot ignore events which occurred after 
his death, insofar as they affected the terms of the original 
agreement. In addition to the amount specified in thc original 
agreement,10 Tranquilla received $500,000 as compensation for 
John's fraud. However, if she had rescinded the original 
agreement, as she was entitled to do, she would in all likeli-
hood have been entitled to considerably more than these sums, 
since J obn 's estate at the time of his death amounted to over 
10Tranquilla received only a fraction of the community property in 
the original agreement, as shown by our opinion in Vai v. Bank of .America 
(1961) su.pra, 56 Cal.2d 329. 
) 
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$1,800,000. The estate was enriched, therefore, to the extent 
that she received less than she was entitled to by rescission. 
Under these unusual circumstances, the question of the extent 
to which John receivcd consideration for the $515,341.56 must 
be measured by the difference between what Tranquilla would 
have received, had she rescinded the agreement, and what she 
actually received under the agreement and the subsequent 
compromise settlement. This is the measure of the consider-
ation received by John for his promise to leave money in trust 
for Madeline's support and is, accordingly, the limit of the 
deduction allowable. The record does not contain information 
sufficient to permit this court to make the necessary calcula. 
tions, and the matter must therefore be returned to the 
probate court for the purpose of ascertaining the deduction 
allowable. 
The executors contend that consideration for John's 
promise to support Madeline may be found in the provisions of 
the agreement that he would only be liable for $10,000 of 
Tranquilla's attorney's fees, that he could retain all income 
from tax refunds as his separate property, and that he was 
free from liability for Tranquilla's obligations. There is no 
indication in the record as to the amount of Tranquilla's 
attorney~s fees and no claim that she had any unpaid obliga-
tions or that John expected to or did receive any tax 
refunds. [10] The fact that John was entitled to Madt-
line's custody cannot be viewed as consideration "in money or 
money's worth" as that term is defined above. 
The order is reversed for further proceedings consistent 
with the views expressed herein. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., 
concurred. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent. 
The Legislature has provided in plain terms that every 
transfer by will is subject to the inheritance tax.1 A testator's 
transfer by bequest or devise in performance of an agreement 
is no less a "transfer by will" than a bequest or devise for 
allY other purpose. Nothing in the present statute or its prede-
lRevenue & Taxation Code. section 13401: "An inheritance tax is 
hereby imposed upon every transfer subject to this part. II 
Revenue & Taxation Code. section 13601: "A tran8fer by will or the 
laws of succession of this State from a person who dies seized or pos-
sessed of the property transferred while a resident of this State ia a 
transfer subject to this part. II (Italics added.) 
" .' 
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cessors suggests that a transfer by will pursuant to an enforce-
able contract is excepted from the normal operation of the tax. 
In all the years since the Legislature first selected succession 
as a subject of tax (Stats. 1853, ch. 127, art. V [Compo Laws 
of Cal, Garfielde, 1853, p. 678]) it has never so much as inti-
mated in any provision for computation of the tax, deductions 
or exemptions, or in any other provision that it meant to 
exclude from "transfer by will" a transfer by will pursuant 
to a contract. . 
The 1893 inheritance tax statute (Stats. 1893, ch. 168, p. 
193) and subsequent statutes have also imposed an inheritance 
tax on certain inter vivos transfers.2 The purpose of this tax is 
to reach inter vivos transfers so like testamentary dispositions 
that they might be used in lieu thereof to avoid the inheritance 
tax. (Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 63 [204 P. 826] ; 
Estate of Thurston (1950) 36 Cal.2d 207, 210-211 [223 P.2d 
12].) The tax on such inter vivos transfers "does not turn 
upon the intention of the grantor, but upon the character of 
the interests created by the transfer." (Estate of Hyde 
(1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 6, 14 [606 P.2d 420].) 
The literal terms of the earlier California statutes would 
have imposed a succession tax on any inter vivos transfer 
made in contemplation of death, or intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at or after the transferor's death, 
even though the transferee had bought and paid full value for 
his intereBt. The California courts, however, like those of most 
other jurisdictions (see 7 A.L.R. 1053; 157 A.L.R. 984), held 
that the statute was not deBigned to tax such transfers made 
for valuable and adequate consideration. The theory of these 
decisions is that "The result of such sales, at full value, would 
in no wise defeat the statutory purpose; the estate would not 
be depleted, but merely changed in form." (In re Kraft's 
Estate (1928) 103 N.J.Eq. 543 [143 A. 764, 766] ; In re Orvis' 
Estate (1918) 223 N.Y. 1 [119 N.E. 88, 89, 3 A.L.R. 1636].) 
The addition of the words "made without valuable and ade-
quate consideration" to the description of taxable inter vivos 
transfers in the 1911 California inheritance tax statute (Stats. 
2In taxing inter viV08 transfers the present statute declares the Legis-
lature's "purpose • . • to tax every transfer made in lieu of or to avoid 
the passing of property by will or the laws of succession. II (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, 113648.) The statute also taxes the vesting of the survivor's right 
in joint tenancy (Rev. & Tax. Code, 113671) or homestead (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, f 13622), the granting of a family allowance in probate (Rev. &I 
Tax. Code, f 13623) and the transfer of the proceeds of life insurance 
(Rev. '" Tax Code, f 13722). 
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1911, ch. 395, p. 713) "served but to clarify and not to change 
the pre-existing law." (Estate of Reynolds (1915) 169 Cal. 
600, 601 [147 P. 268] ; Abstract &- Title Guar. Co. v. State 
(1916) 173 Cal. 691, 694 [161 P. 264].) 
"The use of the word 'valuable' in the act of 1911, excludes 
considerations of love and affection." (Estate of Brix (1919) 
181 Cal. 667, 674 [186 P. 135].) The Brix case also held that 
"adequate consideration" was the same as that required for 
specific performance of a contract. (Civ. Code, § 3391, subd. 
1. ) Since such adequacy was peculiarly a question of fact 
dependent on the circumstances of the particular case 
(O'Hara v. Wattson (1916) 172 Cal. 525 [157 P. 608]), the 
Brix holding gave considerable scope for inheritance tax 
avoidance. Although this court had originally indicated that 
under the 1911 act consideration, to be "adequate," had to be 
reasonably and objectively measurable in money,S the Brix 
case in effect left the measurement of adequacy to the parties 
so long as they "looked at the transaction from a pecuniary 
and not a sentimental standpoint." (181 Cal. at p. 678.)4 To 
aIn Estate of Reynolds (1915) supra, 169 Cal. 600, the decedent had 
trausferred a going business to his adult son for a consideration measur-
able in money, but in circumstances indicating that the transfer was in 
lieu of a t()Stamentary disposition. The value of the consideration was 
much less than the value of the business. In upholding taxability, this 
court said (169 Cal. at p. 604) that such consideration "certainly was 
not adequate from any commercial point of view." The Reynolds case 
was followed in Estate of Jl'elton (1917) 176 Cal. 663, 668 [169 P. 392] 
(inter vivos transfer by father to adult son of stock in closely held family 
corporation). 
4Estate of Brix (181 Cal. at p. 674) declared that the statement as to 
consideration "from a commercial point of view" in the Reynolds case 
, 'was not intended as a complete definition of adequacy of the considera-
tion, but merely to indicate that the particular transaction there con-
sidered, being a sale of a going business, must be regarded from the same 
point of view as any commercial transaction. I' 
The transaction considered in Brix was not commercial. Decedent and 
his wife executed a property settlement agreement and three contempor-
aneous deeds of realty. The controller sought to uphold the imposition ot 
the inheritance tax on only one part of the transaction, a deed from 
decedent and his wife to their three children, reserving a life estate to 
decedent. 
Brix arose under the 1911 inheritance tax statute. The court refused to 
apply, as declarative of previously existing law, the 1917 amendment 
defining "valuable and adequate consideration" as "equal in money or 
in money's worth to the full value of the property transferred." It said 
(181 Cal. at p. 674 et seq.), "We think the rule applicable in specific 
performance cases, so far as the mercenary side of it is concerned, should 
control. Considering the transactions in that light, this transfer ... was 
made for an adequate considf'ration 'in money's worth.' ... [Decedent] 
obtained a release of his wife's claims, not only to the property [formerly 
community 1 he retained, but to nIl other property which he might there-
after acquire, and became free from her interference in any dealings he 
might wish thereafter to make in property .•.. Who can say how much it 
--) --
) 
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emphasize that consideration for inheritance tax purposes 
should be objectively measured, the Legislature in 1917 defined 
"valuable and adequate consideration" as "a consideration 
equal in money or in money's worth to the full value of th(' 
property transferred." (Stats. -1917, ell. 589, § 2, subd. 3, 
p. 882.) This definition was carried into the subsequent inherit-
ance tax statutes and was codified in 1943 (Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 13641). 
Although the Legislature has thus been concerned over the 
years with consideration in connection with inter vivos trans-
fers, it has never spoken of consideration in connection with 
transfers by will. The reason is obvious. 'Vhell the Legislature 
provided that every transfer by will is taxable, that is exactly 
what it meant. (Estate of Grogan (1923) 63 Cal.App. 536, 543 
[219 P. 87].) Its distinction between testamentary and inter 
tJivos transfers is not unreasonable or unfair. (See Stebbins v. 
Riley (1925) 268 U.S. 137, 141-143 [45 S.Ct. 424, 69 L.Ed. 
884, 44 A.L.R. 1454].) The Legislature could reasonably find 
-that ordinarily the making of a will is not the subject of 
bargains entered into for solely pecuniary consideration, and 
in the exercise of its power to classify for tax purposes it 
could quite, properly decide, as it did, to tax "every" "trans-
fer by will. ~ , 
The Legislature's language is certainly apt for that purpose 
in the light of the rules of statutory construction set forth by 
this court with regard to the 1905, 1911, and 1913 inheritance 
tax acts: " 'It is thought to be only reasonable to intend that 
the legislature in making provisions for such proceedings [im-
position and collection of taxes] would take unusual care to 
make use of terms which would plainly express its meaning, in 
order that ministerial officers might not be left in doubt in the 
exercise of unusual powers, and that the citizen might know 
exactly what were his duties and liabilities. A strict construc-
tion in such cases seems reasonable, because presumptively the 
legislature has given in plain terms all the power it intended 
to be exercised.' (1 Cooley on Taxation, 453.) This rule is, of 
course, to be applied only where some ambiguity exists or 
doubt arises from the language used as to the meaning 
intended. 'Beyond the words employed, if the meaning is plain 
was worth to him in money, to have bis marital troubles settled in this 
way' He had a just expectancy of many years of life. It is apparent that 
the parties looked at the transaction from a pecuniary and not a senti-
mental standpoint. They evidently regarded the consideration as ade-
quate and they were in a much better position to place a value thereon 
than is this court." 
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and intelligible, neither officer or court is to go in search of the 
legislative intent.' (Ibid., 450.)" (Estate of Potter (1922) 
supra, 188 Cal. 55, 64-65.) 
It is, of course, still the rule that "it is the function of the 
courts to construe and apply the [inheritance tax] law as it is 
enacted and not to add thereto nor detract therefrom.' , 
(Kirkwood v. Bank of A.merica (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 333, 341 [273 
P.2d 532] ; In re Miller (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 191, 199 [187 P.2d 
722J.) We cannot properly add to the article of the inherit-
ance tax statute concerning transfers by will the provisioJ,l as 
to valuable and adequate consideration that the Legislature 
advisedly placed only in the article concerning inter vivos 
transfers. 
Nor can we make such an addition to the statute on the 
ground invoked in Estate of Belknap (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 
644 [152 P.2d 657], that the will is "merely the conduit" by 
which the testator performs his inter vivos obligation when a 
transfer by will is made in accordance with an enforceable 
contract supported by adequate consideration. I The conclu-
sion, that the transfer by the "mere conduit" of the will is 
not taxable, is based on the mistaken assumption that for 
I5The court in Belknap (66 Cal.App.2d at p. 654) misconstrued an 
opinion of this court (Estate 01 Bath (1937) 10 Cal.2d 399, 401 [15 P.2d 
509, 115 A.L.R. 836]) and a superseded opinion of a District Court of 
Appeal (Estate 01 Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453 [148 P.2d 668]) to reach the 
conclusion that this court had "modified" Esta" 01 GrogaA (1923) 
.tUpra, 63 Cal.App. 536, to free from the inheritance tax the very kind of 
transaction that Grogan. held taxable. The Belknap court derived its char-
acterization of the will as a "mere conduit" from Estate 01 Bath, .tUpra. 
The Bath ease involved facts distinctly different from those involved here 
and from those in Grogan. and Belknap. Bath held that in furlng the in-
heritance tax the probate court could and should look behind what appeared 
to be an absolute devise of the fee in real property from decedent Rath 
to the nephews of his previously deceased wife and tax the transfer for 
what it actually was; i.e., a gift from the previously deceased wife to 
her nephews of an interest in property that decedent Rath held as trustee 
during his life. In other words, the court refused to apply the parol evi-
dence rule to preclude taxation of the beneficial transfer that in fact took 
place. The effect of the decision in Bath was to reduce the amount of tax 
payable by the nephews, because they in fact took from their aunt rather 
than from decedent, a stranger in blood. Conversely, however, an inter 
viv08 transfer that appears absolute on its face can be shown by parol 
evidence to have been made on terms that subject it to the inheritance tax. 
(See Kelly v. Woolsey (1918) 177 Cal. 325,329, 334 [110 P. 831] j Estate 
01 Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 456 [159 P.2d 630].) 
The Bath case states (10 Ca1.2d at p. 401), "Decisions such as In. 1'e 
[Estate of] Grogan, 63 Ca1.App. 536 [291 P. 87], In. 1'e Gould's Estate, 
156 N.Y. 423 [51 N.E. 287], and In re Kidd's Estate, 188 N.Y. 274 [80 
N.E. 924], do not consider the problem determined herein. Said decisions 
are to the effect that a transfer made by will is taxable although in pur-
suance of a contract, in payment of a debt, or for services rendered. Said 
decisions had 1'eference to a Iituation where the testato1' i& di&porin.1I of 
CJ " 
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inheritance tax purposes a contractual obligation to make a 
will is no different from an ordinary contract obligation 
undertaken by decedent during his lifetime and enforceable 
against his estate because by chance he died before performing 
it. When decedent promised to create a testamentary trust, he 
"did not contract to convey; he contracted to make a will' 'G 
(I'll, re Howell's Estate (1931) 255 N.Y. 211 [174 N.E. 457, 
459] ; Oarter v. Oraig (1914) 77 N.H. 200 [90 A. 598, Ann.Cas. 
1914D 1179, 52 L.R.A. N.S. 211]), and the contractual right 
acquired by the obligee was to a transfer subject to the laws 
. governing testamentary transfers (Olarke v. Treasurer (1917) 
226 Mass. 301 [115 N.E. 416, 417]). Therefore, as held in the 
cases last cited, a transfer by will pursuant to contract is 
subject to the inheritance tax. 7 
hiB oum property, not of property held by him in trust for other8, as to 
which his will is a mere conduit of title." (Italics added.) 
The court in BeZknap (66 Cal.App.2d at p. 654) seized on the last quoted 
phrase (applied by the Rath court, of course, to the will of Mr. Bath, not 
the wills of Grogan and Gould) and incorrectly said that the opinion of 
the District Court of Appeal in Estate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453 [148 
P.2d 668] (superseded by the opinion of this court in 26 Cal.2d 453) 
, 'cites with approval the Estate of Rath as authority for the construction 
of the statute holding that the Inheritance Tax Act imposes a tax on the 
theory of 'succession,' and not merely because the will is 'used as a means 
of conveyance' "; thus Belknap came to the erroneous conclusion "that 
the Grogan case has been modified to that extent." 
8The essential difference in the rights of the beneficiary under a contract 
to create an inter vi110S trust and a contract to create a testamentary trust 
is obvious. When John's promise in the present case was made to maintain 
in effect a will providing for distribution into a trust for Madeline's bene-
1it of an amount of money or property that would adequately pay for her 
support during the remainder of her life. it gave the donee beneficiary 
110 more than the possibility that at some future time she might have some 
kind of cause of action against someone (see Brown v. Superior Oourt 
(1949) 34 Cal.2d 559, 563 [212 P.2d 878]; Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 
CaUd 567, 593 [349 P.2d 289]; Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Ca1.2d 127, 
130 et seq. [17 Cal.Rptr. 873, 367 P.2d 415]; Day v. Greene (1963) 59 
CaUd 404. 411 [29 Cal.Rptr. 785. 380 P.2d 385. 94 A.L.R. 802]) if she 
did not predecease John (see O'Brien v. O'Brien (1925) 197 Cal. 577,589 
[241 P. 861]). 
7The New York court in Howell's Estate, B'Upra, stated that any con-
fusion in previous New York decisions was cleared by N. Y. Laws of 1925. 
chapter 143. That statute (similar to our inheritance tax statute) pro-
vided that if an inter vivos transfer, otherwise liable to tax, "is made for 
a valuable consideration, the portion of the transfer for which the 
grantor or vendor receives equivalent monetary value is not taxable." 
but clearly did not so provide as to transfers by will or intestacy. 
Howell holds that under the 1925 New York statute both transfers 
by will and receipt of property by specific enforcement of a contract to 
transfer by will are "subject to the rule formulated in eases like Gould's 
nnd Kidd 's." (In re Gould's Estate (1898) ]56 N.Y. 423 [51 N.E. 287, 
288]. imposing a tax on a testamentary transfer in ngreed payment for 
services rendered by the testator's sonj In re Kidd'8 Estate (1907) 188 
~C.Jd~ 
) 
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One who bargains and pays for a promise to make a will 
presumably knows that thc promised transfer will be subject 
to the tax, particularly since our inheritance tax statutes have 
always unequivocally made a transfer by will taxable.s Taxa-
bility of the transfer the legatee and testator have bargained 
for is a part of the bargain. If the legatee wishes a distributive 
share undiminished by inheritance tax, he can bargain for a 
will so providing. (See Estate of Irwin (1925) 196 Cal. 366, 
375 [237 P. 1074].) The same, of course, is true when the 
contract to make a will is for the benefit of one who is not a 
party to the contract, as in the case of Madeline here. 
Adherence to the statute does not put a premium on the 
violation of such agreements. A decedent's failure to perform 
his contract to make a specified testamentary disposition does 
not relieve from the operation of the inheritance tax statute a 
transfer by intestate succession or by a will that does not 
conform to his contract. Whether or not the decedent performs 
his contract, transfers of his property are subject to the 
inheritance tax. Illustrative of this situation is In re Kidd'$ 
Estate (1907) supra, 188 N.Y. 274 [80 N.E. 924]. There 
decedent, by antenuptial contract with his wife, promised to 
bequeath all his property to the wife's daughter (his step-
daughter).. He died leaving a will that bequeathed his 
property to others. 'rhe stepdaughter obtained a decree direct-
ing the executors and beneficiaries named in the will to 
execute releases and conveyances of the property to her. The 
court of appeals rejected the stepdaughter's contention that 
there was no taxable transfer. It pointed out that had decedent 
performed his contract, the transfer by will would have been 
taxed, and that in enforcing the contract equity" converts the 
devisees under the will, or the heirs at law or next of kin, as 
the case may require, into trustees for the beneficiary under 
the original agreement." Therefore, the court concluded, "the 
devolution of the property has in fact taken place under the 
N.Y. 274 [80 N.E. 924], imposing the inheritance tax on the transfer of 
decedent's property to plaintiff stepdaughter, decreed in her suit for 
specific performance of decedent's antenuptial agreement with plaintiff's 
mother.) 
8 Although there has been a conflict since 1944 between Belknap and 
the earlier Grogan decision, the State Controller's regulations continue to 
follow tha inheritance tax law as written: "A transfer by will is subject 
to the Inheritance Tax Law even though made pursuant to an agreement 
between the transferee and the decedent for an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth which was received by the decedent. 
In such case, the transferee takes from the deceient under the will and 
not by virtue of the agreement." (Cal.Admin.Code (1959), tit. 18, 
§§ 13601·13603 (a).) 
) 
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will, and such devolution is subject to the transfer taX." (See 
also People v. Field's Estate (1910) 248 Ill. 147 [93 N.E. 721, 
723, 33 L.R.A. N.S. 230] : "Illustration is not necessary to 
show that any other rule would enable parties desiring to do 
1>0 to in a measure defeat the object and purpose ,of the stat-
ute. ") 
When the beneficiary of the contract to make a will that 
decedent has breached obtains specific performance, those to 
whom the property passes by the law of testate or intestate 
succession hold as trustees for the beneficiary. (Ludwicki v. 
Guerin (1961) supra, 57 Ca1.2d 127, 130.) The beneficial 
transfer that in fact takes place is taxed (see Estate of Rath 
(1937) supra, 10 Cal.2d 399), and the beneficiary of the 
contract pays the tax: rather than those to whom the property 
devolved by operation of the will or intestacy. 
It is contended that it would be anomalous to impose a tax 
whenever a testator provides in his will that a creditor shall 
receive a stated sum in payment of a 'debt owed by the 
testator, although there would be no tax when the testator 
failed to specify that the debt be paid, thus requiring the 
creditor to file a claim against the estate. There is no such 
anomaly. No statute provides that a testator can force his 
creditor to take a stated sum as a taxable legacy and thus 
deprive the creditor of his right to be paid as a creditor. 'Vhen 
a testator gives a legacy to a creditor in payment of a debt, the 
choice to collect as creditor or to take as legatee remains with 
the creditor. He can renounce the legacy and collect his claim 
as a debt. (See Sheppard v. Desmond (Tex.Civ.App. 1943) 169 
S.W.2d 788, 790.) When the creditor renounces, he is not 
chargeable with any tax: on the amount he receives in payment 
of his claim. 
Assume a will that provides, "I bequeath to C the sum of 
$10,000 in payment of my debt to him." Assume further that 
the amount of the debt is $10,000, that C renounces the legacy 
and files a creditor's claim, and that the claim is allowed.9 
The tax would be computed as follows: 
9The following provisions of the inheritance tax statute (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, dive 2, pt. 8) would govern computation of the tax: 
, 'If a transferee under a will renounces his rights under the will . . . 
the tax is nevertheless computed in accordance with the terms of the 
will admitted to probate." (§ 13409.) 
"l'be tax is computed upon the clear market value of tlie property 
transferred. • . ." (§ 13402.) '" Clear market value' means the 
market value of any property included in any transfer, less any deduc-
tions allowable by this part." (§ 13312.) 
The article of the statute relating to deductions "is a limitation on 
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particular transferee •. •• $10,000 
Allowable deduction provided in 
section 13981 et seq... ••• 10,000 
Clear market value. •• - 0 -
Tax.. •• None 
If the value of a legacy left in express payment of the 
testator's debt to the legatee is greater than the amount of the 
debt, the legatee may prefer to take the legacy. In such case, 
however, he cannot also have the amount of the debt deducted 
from the value of the legacy in computation of the tax. (Rev. 
& Tax. Code, § 13981.) The testator gives the legatee-creditor 
his choice and the legatee-creditor takes his choice with 
presumed knowledge of the inheritance tax. There is nothing 
unfair in the imposition of the same inheritance tax on a 
legacy accepted in payment of an ordinary' debt as that 
imposed on another legacy of equal value to one who is not a 
creditor. Different taxes may be imposed on transfers' of the 
same value if the circumstances differ. (Stebbins v. Riley 
(1925) supra, 268 U.S. 137, affirming Estate of Watkinscm 
(1923) 191 Cal. 591, 599 [217 P. 1073]; Estwte of Elston 
(1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 652, 660 [90 P.2d 608].) 
It has been suggested that it would be unfair to tax a 
transfer by will pursuant to an inter vivos contract in situ-
ations similar to that in the Belknap case, supra, 66 Cal. App. 
2d 644. For a concededly valuable and adequate consideration 
within the meaning of the inheritance tax statute Belknap 
contracted in a property settlement agreement to provide by 
will that his executor purchase a $20,000 annuity for his wife. 
deductions allowable. It is not intended by this article to allow a8 a 
deduction anything that does not actually reduce the amount of an 
inheritance or transfer." (§ 13981.) 
, 'In determining the market value of property included in any trans· 
fer subject to this part. the deductions specified in this article. and no 
others. are allowed against the appraised value of the property. if the 
deductions: (a) Are obligations of the decedent or his estate. except as 
otherwise indicated in this article; and (b) Are paid by the estate or the 
transferee." (§ 13982.) "Debts of a decedent owed by him at the date 
of his death are deductible from the appraised value of property in· 
cluded in any transfer subject to this part made by the decedent." 
(§ 13983.) 
The word "paid" as used in section 13982 does not mean that the 
money must have been" physically paid" but may refer to "the amount 
finally fixed and which is enforceable." (Estate of Slack (1948) 86 Cal. 
App.2d 49. 53 [194 P.2d 61]; sce Estate of Sl:ifl,"ker (1956) 41 Ca1.2d 
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His will referred to the property settlement agreement and 
directed the executor to purchase the annuity. If the parties 
intended that the wife, having paid full value for a $20,000 
annuity, should receive an annuity . undiminished by the 
. inheritance tax, the solution to the problem lay not in a judi-
cial rewriting of the inheritance tax statute, but in construing 
the will in light of the contract as bequeathing $20,000 net for 
purchase of the annuity. A legacy of a specified amount free of 
inheritance tax is construed as a legacy of a sum sufficient to 
net the amount specified after payment of the inheritance tax 
thereon, namely, of the amount specified and "an additional 
amount sufficient to pay the tax and the tax upon the tax ad 
infinitum." (Estate of Irwin (1925) supra, 196 Cal. 366, 
375.) Such a construction of the Belknap legacy would effect 
the intent expressed by the will (which was also the intent of 
the parties to the inter vivos arrangement) without the distor-
tion of the statute resorted to in the Belknap opinion. 
Adoption of the theory of the Belknap case not only distorts 
a clearly expressed and proper legislative purpose but leads to 
confusion and uncertainty in the administration of the statute. 
I would therefore disapprove Estate of Belknap, supra, 66 
Cal.App.2d 644, and adhere to Estate of Grogan, supra, 63 
CalApp. 536, which failhfu~ly followei the statute. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
28, 1966. Traynor, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
